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THE MERRILL DOCTRINE AND FEDERALLY REINSURED 
CROP INSURERS 
CHAD G. MARZEN* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since 1947, the Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill decision has 
operated to bar claims of equitable estoppel against agents of the federal 
government.  However, the applicability of the Merrill doctrine to the 
equitable estoppel and waiver claims of insureds against federally reinsured 
private crop insurers is unclear.  There is a split of authority on this 
significant issue, and it remains largely unresolved in numerous 
jurisdictions. 
An early trend developed where the courts applied the Merrill doctrine 
to alleged misrepresentations of agents of the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (“FCIC”) as well as the agents of private insurers.  In the early 
to mid-2000s, the decisions of three state courts—Kentucky, Georgia and 
Tennessee—declined to extend the shield of the Merill doctrine to federally 
reinsured private crop insurers.  Most recently, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, in the Skymont Farms v. 
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. decision, revived life into Merill and held it 
applied involving a federally reinsured crop insurance policy. 
This article recommends a rule that could balance both the interests of 
farmer insureds and federally reinsured private crop insurers in future cases 
involving the Merrill doctrine.  It proposes that (1) a heavy presumption 
against the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private crop insurers 
be followed, and (2) that Merrill only apply when a federally reinsured 
private crop insurer makes a “clear and convincing” evidentiary showing 
that the farmer insured failed to adequately investigate the provisions 
concerning a crop insurance policy, or that Merrill only apply when there is 
a “clear and convincing” evidentiary showing that the insured made a 
fraudulent misrepresentation on an application for insurance. 
 
 
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Florida State University, College of Business – 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Crop insurance continues to stand as a topic in the public spotlight.  
The federal crop insurance program, a vital source of support for the toil 
and efforts of America’s farmers since the Great Depression,1 faces an 
uncertain future in the years ahead as a number of policymakers have 
proposed significant reforms to the program.  Within the past year, several 
policymakers have proposed reforms to the program that would cap the 
amount of subsidies a farmer can receive from the program and bar 
subsidies to any farmer with an adjusted gross income above a certain 
 
1.  For a more extensive discussion of the background, history and key elements of the 
federal crop insurance program, see Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Bad Faith:  Protection for 
America’s Farmers, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 619 (2013) (hereinafter “Marzen I”); Steffen N. 
Johnson, A Regulatory ‘Waste Land’:  Defining a Justified Federal Role in Crop Insurance, 72 
N.D. L. REV. 505 (1996); David A. Domina, Federal Crop Insurance:  What It Means and How It 
Works, NEBRASKA LAW.  2012. 
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level.2  Occasional allegations of fraud within the program have also 
surfaced in recent months and years.3  One major case within the past year 
in North Carolina allegedly involved potential fraud of nearly $100 million, 
which purportedly involved a number of insurance brokers, adjusters, and 
farmers.4  With the new farm bill still currently stalled in the halls of the 
United States Congress, the philosophical debate concerning the role of the 
federal government as a subsidizer of crop risks in agriculture will 
undoubtedly continue. 
In North Dakota, sixteen different private insurance companies 
currently provide federally reinsured crop insurance policies to farmers 
throughout the state.5  The North Dakota Supreme Court has confronted 
cases involving crop insurance for over one hundred years.  One of the first 
reported cases concerning insurance on crops, Berglund v. State Farmers’ 
Mutual Hail Insurance Co. of Waseca, Minnesota was decided by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court over a century ago in 1913.6  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed a trial court ruling for a plaintiff on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case to determine fact issues 
concerning alleged misrepresentations concerning the plaintiff’s purported 
insurable interest in the crop under the policy.7  Since Berglund, courts in 
North Dakota have held that the Federal Crop Insurance Act does not 
completely preempt state law claims based upon breach of contract, 
 
2.  Brian Wingfield, Crop Insurance Critics Make Push to Curb U.S. Subsidies, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Sept. 12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/crop-insurance-backers-step-
up-lobbying-to-blunt-critics html.  
3.  David J. Lynch, Fraud Stealing $100 Million Shows Flaws in U.S. Crop Insurance, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-11/fraud-stealing 
-100-million-shows-flaws-in-u-s-crop-insurance html.  For more information concerning the legal 
issues concerning crop insurance fraud, see Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Fraud and 
Misrepresentations:  Contemporary Issues and Possible Remedies, 37 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 675 (2013) (hereinafter “Marzen II”); see also U.S. v. Torlai, 728 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 
2013) (upholding conviction of individual convicted by jury of sixteen counts of allegedly making 
false claims for agricultural benefits). 
4.  Lynch, supra note 3. 
5.  U.S Dep’t of Agriculture Risk Mgmt. Agency, Crop Insurance Providers:  North Dakota 
for 2013 (Jul. 25, 2013), 
http://www3.rma.usda.gov/tools/agents/companies/2013/north_dakotaCI.cfm.  The sixteen private 
insurance companies which provided federally reinsured crop insurance policies in North Dakota 
for 2013 include:  ACE American Insurance Company; Agrinational Insurance Company, Inc.; 
American Agri-Business Insurance Company; American Agricultural Insurance Company; 
Everest Reinsurance Company; Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa; Great 
American Insurance Company; GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company; Hudson Insurance 
Company; John Deere Insurance Company; NAU Country Insurance Company; Occidental Fire & 
Casualty Company of North Carolina; Producers Agriculture Insurance Company; Rural 
Community Insurance Company; Starr Indemnity & Liability Company; and XL Reinsurance 
America, Inc.  Id. 
6.  142 N.W. 941 (N.D. 1913); see also Marzen II, supra note 3, at 690. 
7.  Berglund, 142 N.W. at 943; see also Marzen II, supra note 3, at 690. 
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negligence, and misrepresentations,8 that a two-year statute of limitations 
relating to claims against licensed insurance agents applies in a case 
involving allegations of negligence concerning handling of crop insurance 
claims,9 and have examined bad faith in the context of a crop insurance 
claim.10  North Dakota remains a national leader in the development of the 
law concerning crop insurance claims, and the state’s national prominence 
in agriculture11 portends a future of many more legal issues unique to crop 
insurance being resolved in state courts. 
While the number of crop insurance claims inevitably vary from season 
to season, in September 2013, the United States Department of Agriculture 
released figures that indicated farmers in the United States filed claims on 
approximately six times more land than in the prior planting season.12  The 
presence of an enlarged number of claims in more recent months has an 
increasing number of commentators taking note of the significant legal 
issues facing crop insurance litigation.13  As eighteen different private crop 
insurance companies today provide federally reinsured crop insurance to 
farmers,14 these companies all face potential liability exposures in the event 
of a dispute regarding the circumstances surrounding a federally reinsured 
crop insurance policy. 
Amidst all of the issues in crop insurance litigation, a significant issue 
remains largely unresolved in many jurisdictions and is subject to a current 
split in authority:  does the Merrill Doctrine15 (the doctrine that allows the 
federal government to disavow a government agent’s unauthorized acts)16 
 
8.  Bullinger v. Trebas, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (D.N.D. 2003).  
9.  Overboe v. Farm Credit Serv. of Fargo, 2001 ND 58, ¶ 17, 623 N.W.2d 372, 377. 
10.  See Seifert v. Farmer’s Union Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1993). 
11.  See Dean J. Haas, Falling Down on the Job:  Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a No 
-Fault to a Worker-Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 208 (2003) (describing North Dakota as 
a “penultimate agriculture state”); Jennifer J. Mattson, North Dakota Jumps on the Agricultural 
Disparagement Law Bandwagon By Enacting Legislation to Meet a Concern Already Actionable 
Under State Defamation Law and Failing to Heed Constitutionality Concerns, 74 N.D. L. REV. 
89, 89 (1998) (describing North Dakota as an “agricultural powerhouse”). 
12.  Whitney McFerron & Jeff Wilson, U.S. Crop-Insurance Claims Jump Amid Planting 
Delays, USDA Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013 
-09-17/u-s-crop-insurance-claims-jump-amid-planting-delays-usda-says.html.  
13.  See J. Grant Ballard, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Litigation of Federally Reinsured 
Crop Insurance Claims, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 531 (2013) (hereinafter “Ballard I”); Grant 
Ballard, Representing Farmers in Crop Insurance Disputes:  When Your Client is Denied the 
Farm Safety Net, 48 ARKANSAS LAWYER, Summer 2013, at 26; Domina, supra note 1; Marzen I, 
supra note 1. 
14.  U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture Risk Mgmt. Agency, Crop Insurance Providers List for 2014 
(Jul. 25, 2013), http://www3 rma.usda.gov/tools/agents/companies/indexCI.cfm.  
15.  Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (hereinafter “Merrill”). 
16.  David K. Thompson, Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
551, 551 (1979) (“Traditionally, courts have not permitted estoppel of the government, no matter 
how compelling the circumstances.”). 
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apply to bar the estoppel and waiver claims of insureds against federally 
reinsured crop insurance companies?  Suppose, hypothetically, that a wheat 
farmer procures a crop insurance policy and the farmer is uncertain of the 
meaning of a provision in the policy.  Justifiably relying upon the expertise 
of either an agent of a private crop insurer or an agent of the FCIC, the 
wheat farmer takes an action that ultimately results in a loss of coverage 
under the policy.  Even despite the faulty advice of either the private crop 
insurer agent or FCIC agent, can the private crop insurer be insulated from 
liability by disavowing the agents’ actions?  The outcome of this question 
in courts throughout the country may have a significant effect on the claims 
of farmer insureds. 
This article examines the issue of whether the Merrill doctrine should 
apply in cases involving federally reinsured crop insurance companies.  Part 
I provides an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s Merrill 
decision and an overview of the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel 
in insurance law.  Part II discusses the reported cases to date that have ruled 
on the application of the Merrill doctrine in the context of federal crop 
insurance.  Two early federal cases, the Mann v. Federal Crop Insurance 
Corp.17 case in 1983 and Walpole v. Great American Insurance 
Companies18 in 1994, led to the development of an early trend where courts 
applied the Merrill doctrine to alleged misrepresentations of FCIC agents as 
well as the agents of private insurers.  In the early to mid-2000s, this trend 
reversed in an opposite direction.  The Supreme Court of Kentucky in 
Dailey v. American Growers Insurance,19 the Georgia Court of Appeals in 
Rain & Hail Insurance Services, Inc. v. Vickery,20 and the Tennessee Court 
of Appeals in Simms v. Insurance Co. of North America21 all declined to 
apply the Merrill doctrine.  However, the application of the Merrill doctrine 
in the context of federal crop insurance is far from a settled issue.  Most 
recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee, in the Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. 
decision, revived life into Merrill and held that it applied in a case 
involving a federally reinsured crop insurance policy.22 
Finally, Part III analyzes the policies and issues concerning application 
of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured private crop insurers.  The 
article proposes that the courts adopt a heavy presumption against applying 
 
17.  710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983). 
18.  914 F. Supp. 1283 (D.S.C. 1994). 
19.  103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003). 
20.  618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
21.  No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005). 
22.  No. 4:09-cv-65, 2012 WL 1193407 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2012). 
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the Merrill doctrine in cases involving federally reinsured crop insurers.  It 
contends that the Merrill doctrine should only apply in cases where the 
FCIC or federally reinsured crop insurer make a “clear and convincing” 
evidentiary showing that a farmer insured failed to properly investigate the 
provisions concerning a crop insurance policy and/or the surrounding 
circumstances associated with a crop insurance claim.  The adoption of a 
heavy presumption against the application of the Merrill doctrine by the 
courts will better allow farmer insureds to recover in cases where a farmer 
insured properly conducts due diligence surrounding a claim but is misled 
by the alleged misrepresentations, whether innocent or intentional, of either 
an FCIC agent or agent of a private crop insurer.  As a policy matter, a 
heavy presumption against the application of the Merrill Doctrine should 
apply because claims arising under crop insurance policies in many cases 
implicate the very economic livelihood of farmers. 
II. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORP. V. MERRILL AND THE 
WAIVER AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINES IN 
INSURANCE LAW 
As a general doctrinal rule, employers are held liable for the negligent 
acts and/or omissions of their employees and agents through the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in agency law.23  Prior to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Merrill, it was a relatively unsettled question as to 
whether the same rule applied to federal government agencies with respect 
to agents of the federal government.  Prior to 1980, the federal government 
issued all federal crop insurance policies through the FCIC.24  Merrill stood 
as a controlling decision in crop insurance litigation for decades, as the 
FCIC remained the most significant entity providing crop insurance in the 
United States. 
A. THE MERRILL DECISION 
The facts of the Merrill case began with copartners that applied for 
federal crop insurance to insure wheat crops in Idaho in early 1945.25  The 
county Agricultural Conservation Committee acted as agent of the FCIC.26  
The copartners informed the conservation committee that a large majority 
of the acres on which they were planting spring wheat were reseeded as 
 
23.  RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, SMITH & ROBERSON’S BUSINESS LAW 368-
69 (15th ed. 2012). 
24.  Bullinger v. Trebas, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (D.N.D. 2003); Marzen I, supra note 1, 
at 626. 
25.  Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382 (1947). 
26.  Id. 
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winter wheat acreage, and the conservation committee informed them that 
the entire crop was insurable.27  In an unfortunate turn of events for the 
copartners, however, not only was the majority of the spring wheat crop 
destroyed by drought, but the crop was not insurable because of the 
reseeding.28  The FCIC denied the copartners insurance claim, and litigation 
ensued.29 
At the trial, the copartners contended that the committee misled them 
into believing that the entire spring wheat crop was insurable.30  In 
response, the FCIC argued that wheat crop insurance regulations barred 
recovery for the copartners as a matter of law.31  The trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiffs on the claim, and the Supreme Court of Idaho 
affirmed, adopting the reasoning that the Agricultural Conservation 
Committee, as agent of the FCIC, could bind the FCIC, irrespective of their 
statements that were inconsistent with the wheat crop insurance regulations 
in place.32 
The United State Supreme Court reversed the Idaho Supreme Court 
and found in favor of the FCIC.33  In its decision, the Court adopted more of 
a caveat emptor34 type of approach to individuals and entities entering into 
contracts with the government.  In states that adhere to the caveat emptor 
doctrine with regard to real estate transactions, buyers of property who later 
find out the property is defective in some way are precluded from recovery 
in contract if they failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would 
have discovered the defect in the absence of fraud by the seller.35  Similar to 
a buyer of real property who may incur risks associated with the purchase 
of property, the Court in Merrill noted that individuals who enter into “an 
 
27.  Id.  
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 382-83. 
33.  Id. at 386. 
34.  Caveat emptor is from Latin meaning “let the buyer beware.”  It is defined as:  “A 
doctrine holding that purchasers buy at their own risk.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (8th ed. 
2004). 
35.  Alex M. Johnson, An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information:  Lessons 
Learned from the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 102 (1988)  
Essentially, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not require a seller to 
disclose defects and precludes recovery by a buyer for structural and other defects in 
the property being sold where:  (1) the alleged defective condition is open to 
observation and is discoverable upon a reasonable inspection; (2) the buyer has the 
opportunity to examine the premises; and (3) there was no fraud on the part of the 
vendor with respect to the condition of the premises. 
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arrangement” with the government take the risk that agents of the 
government stay within their authority.36 
In ruling for the FCIC, the Court in Merrill also remarked that 
individuals and entities have constructive notice37 of all federal statutory 
regulations in effect.38  Thus, the Court found the copartners held 
constructive notice of the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations.39  Even the 
case of “innocent ignorance,” if it results in adversity, would be insufficient 
for recovery.40  The Supreme Court stated: 
Accordingly, the Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations were binding 
on all who sought to come within the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 
regardless of actual knowledge of what is in the Regulations or of 
the hardship resulting from innocent ignorance . . . The ‘terms and 
conditions’ defined by the Corporation, under authority of 
Congress, for creating liability on the part of the Government 
preclude recovery for the loss of the reseeded wheat no matter with 
what good reason the respondents thought they had obtained 
insurance from the Government.41 
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Merrill appeared to 
downplay the observation that the FCIC agent allegedly misled the 
insureds, despite the presence of the official regulations that were in effect.  
From the date of the decision in Merrill to 1980, Merrill essentially covered 
all cases of alleged negligence and misrepresentations by the FCIC and 
FCIC agents concerning crop insurance coverage.  Merrill has since been 
expanded to a number of areas involving allegations of misleading 
statements and actions of federal agents, including alleged misleading 
statements concerning Social Security benefits,42 military housing 
benefits,43 medicare cost reimbursement procedures,44 and payment-in-kind 
contracts between individuals and the Commodity Credit Corporation.45 
 
36.  Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384 (“Whatever the form in which the Government functions, 
anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately 
ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his 
authority stays within the bounds of his authority.”). 
37.  “Constructive notice is notice which the law deems sufficient to apprise the world of a 
fact.”  Jeffrey H. Sussman, An Imperfect Answer to a Question of Perfection:  The 1993 
Amendment to California Civil Code Section 2924H(C) and the Avoidability of Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Sales Under Sections 544(A)(3), 549, and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 22 CAL. 
BANKR. J. 287, 296 (1995).  
38.  Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-85. 
39.  Id. at 385. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  See Cheers v. Sec’y of HEW, 610 F.2d 463, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1980).  
43.  See Brant v. United States, 597 F.2d 716, 720 (Cl. Ct. 1979).  
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While Merrill still has an expansive reach in a number of areas, the 
federal crop insurance program changed in 1980.  Following the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act (“FCIA”) of 1980, the program expanded to include 
private crop insurers who could underwrite crop insurance policies and then 
receive the benefit of the federal government as a reinsurer.46  With private 
insurance companies now offering federally reinsured crop insurance 
policies, it is an open question as to whether the Merrill doctrine applies to 
a federally reinsured crop insurer.  Can waiver and equitable estoppel 
claims survive in cases of alleged misrepresentations by FCIC agents and 
agents of federally reinsured crop insurance companies?  Waiver and 
equitable estoppel claims have a longstanding presence not only in 
insurance law, but in North Dakota law as well. 
B. DOCTRINE OF WAIVER 
The doctrine of waiver is commonly defined as encompassing 
situations in which an individual or party intentionally or voluntarily waives 
a known right.47  An insurer or insurer’s agent can exercise a wavier 
through express statements or in writing.48  In addition, a waiver might be 
implied in the insurance context where an insurer or insurer’s agent “acts in 
a manner inconsistent with an intention to enforce strict compliance of the 
contested provision . . . and the insured is naturally led to believe that the 
right has been intentionally given up.”49  In the area of insurance, an 
express or implied waiver of specific policy provisions of the insurance 
contract may result if the statements, conduct, and/or written documents of 
an insurer or insurer’s agents indicate such a waiver.50  One instance where 
waiver may occur in insurance litigation is if an insurer accepts a late 
premium payment.51 
 
44.  See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65 (1984).  
45.  See Raines v. United States, 12 C1. Ct. 530, 532 (1987).  
46.  Marzen I, supra note 1, at 626. 
47.  Jeremy P. Brummond, When Will the Smoke Clear?  Application of Waiver and Estoppel 
in Missouri Insurance Law, 66 MO. L. REV. 225, 225 (2001)  (“Waiver is generally referred to as 
the voluntary (or intentional) relinquishment of a known right.”). 
48.  Id. at 229-30. 
49.  Brendle v. Shenandoah Life Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 515, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). 
50.  46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1144 (2013). 
51.  Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes:  Toward a 
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 620-21 (1996)  
[A]lthough a majority of courts have held that coverage under an insurance policy 
cannot be created or enlarged by waiver, nevertheless waiver may still be utilized to 
preserve existing insurance coverage when  . . . an insurer accepts a late premium 
payment or ratifies policy coverage in some other manner, although it has legitimate 
legal grounds to cancel the policy . . . . 
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The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the issue of insurer’s 
conditional acceptance of a late premium payment in Hanson v. Cincinnati 
Life Insurance Co.52  In Hanson, the beneficiaries of a life insurance policy 
appealed a trial court order granting summary judgment to the insurer on 
their claim of death benefits under the policy.53  The underlying facts of 
Hanson involved a situation where a life insurance policy allegedly lapsed 
due to the nonpayment of a premium.54  However, following the lapse, the 
insurer reportedly extended a late-payment offer that had an expiration 
date.55  While a check was apparently dated by the decedent with a date 
prior to the expiration of the offer, the insurer reported it did not receive the 
check until after the offer’s expiration.56  Although the insurer allegedly 
cashed the premium check, the insurer requested the insured send an 
additional premium payment and also complete a request for reinstatement 
form since the policy purportedly lapsed.57  The additional premium 
payment and request for reinstatement form were apparently not completed 
prior to the insured’s death.58 
On appeal, the beneficiaries of the decedent contended that the insurer 
waived its right to deny coverage under the life insurance policy when it 
cashed the check in response to the initial late payment offer.59  In response, 
the insurer contended that it conditionally accepted the check and did not 
intend to waive the lapse of the policy.60  Upholding the summary judgment 
decision for the insurer, the North Dakota Supreme Court found there was 
no issue of material fact as to waiver because the insurer’s written 
correspondence “unequivocally informed [the insured] that the policy had 
‘lapsed,’” among other statements.61  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
thusly declared the following rule: 
The unconditional acceptance of a premium after the expiration of 
a grace period is universally recognized as a waiver of an insurer’s 
right to treat a policy as lapsed for nonpayment of the 
premium . . . . There is no waiver, however, if the insurer 
conditionally accepts and retains a late premium subject to 
reinstatement, and the insurer’s acceptance and placement of a 
 
52.  1997 ND 230, 571 N.W.2d 363. 
53.  Id. ¶ 1, 571 N.W.2d at 365. 
54.  Id. ¶ 3. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. ¶ 4. 
57.  Id. ¶ 5. 
58.  Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 571 N.W.2d at 366. 
59.  Id. ¶ 12. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. ¶ 22, 571 N.W.2d at 368. 
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check in a suspense account pending reinstatement of the policy 
does not constitute a waiver if the acceptance is clearly 
conditional.62 
In the context of crop insurance, the issue of waiver is one that has 
appeared in reported cases to date.  Similar to Hanson, at least one court has 
faced the issue of whether the acceptance of a late premium payment by the 
FCIC on a crop insurance policy constituted a waiver.  In Glass v. Federal 
Crop Insurance Corp., a Missouri farmer was issued crop insurance 
policies for corn and wheat crops in 1979, 1980, and 1981 for himself and 
his farming business.63  In order to receive crop insurance for the 1982 crop 
year, the insureds were required to pay the premiums due for the 1981 year 
on or before October 10, 1981, the termination date for the policies.64  
However, this allegedly did not occur, and the FCIC terminated the policies 
at issue.65  Apparently, the FCIC accepted late payments of the premiums 
on the policies, and the insureds contended that the acceptance of the late 
premium payments constituted waiver of denial of coverage for the 1982 
crop year.66 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
ruled in favor of the FCIC and rejected the insured’s waiver argument.67  
Despite the FCIC’s acceptance of the late premium payments, the court 
emphasized the fact that the insureds’ policies terminated and that the only 
way insurance coverage could have been reintroduced would be through 
reapplication for coverage.68  Interestingly, compared with Hanson, the 
insurer conditionally accepted the late premium payment on the life 
insurance policy, but in Glass, the FCIC placed no conditional acceptance 
on the late premium payments for the crop insurance policies at issue.  With 
the absence of a waiver and the lack of a conditional acceptance of a late 
premium payment in Glass, it might be argued that in cases involving the 
waiver doctrine and crop insurance, an insurer’s acceptance of a late 
premium payment, by itself, does not constitute circumstances sufficient to 
support a finding of a waiver.  However, two things must be noted.  First, 
Glass involved the FCIC’s acceptance of a late premium payment, not a 
private crop insurer selling federally reinsured policies.69  Second, the court 
 
62.  Id. ¶ 21 (internal citations omitted). 
63.  643 F. Supp. 272, 273 (E.D. Mo. 1986).  
64.  Id.  
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 274. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id.  Although the facts of Glass involved the FCIC’s acceptance of a late premium 
payment, it still might be argued that Glass should apply to cases involving federally reinsured 
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noted that even if the payments had the effect of continuing the policies for 
succeeding years, the insureds could not prevail since the insureds allegedly 
did not file an acreage report required by the policies.70  Thus, the alleged 
failure of the insureds to satisfy the terms and conditions of the policies 
would still defeat coverage and the doctrine of waiver even if the court 
found sufficient evidence of a waiver. 
Grant Ballard, an attorney who litigates numerous crop insurance 
disputes, has noted that arbitration of disputes is often a contractual 
requirement in federally reinsured crop insurance policies.71  The issue of a 
federally reinsured crop insurer’s waiver of arbitration in a crop insurance 
policy was addressed in In re 2000 Sugar Beet Crop Insurance Litigation.72  
In the case, a number of growers of sugar beets alleged waiver of arbitration 
provisions under multi-peril crop insurance policies.73  The insureds alleged 
that both the defendants’ removal of the case from state to federal court and 
its filing of a third-party complaint were actions contrary to an intention to 
arbitrate the claims.74  The court disagreed, noting that the answers of the 
defendants included an affirmative defense of the right to arbitrate,75 and 
the court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.76 
Finally, one other significant issue that is often litigated in crop 
insurance and other insurance cases is whether an insurer or insurer’s agents 
can waive specific policy provisions of an insurance contract.  Many 
standard insurance policies, including crop insurance policies, require an 
insured to furnish timely written notice of a loss to an insurer in order for 
 
crop insurers since at the time of the decision-1986-private insurers were operating in the sale of 
federally reinsured crop insurance policies. 
70.  Id. at 275  
Even if plaintiffs’ late payments had the effect of continuing the policies to cover 
succeeding crop years, plaintiffs still would not prevail.  Plaintiffs’ 1982 crop did not 
qualify for coverage.  Plaintiffs failed to file an acreage report for the crop year 1982 
showing zero acreage as required by the policies.  This failure also would serve to 
terminate the policies. 
71.  Ballard I, supra note 13, at 539  
Arbitration is often required by the terms of the Common Crop Insurance Policy, 
under an arbitration clause pertaining to disputes between an insured and the private 
insurance provider.  The current arbitration provision found within the CCIP provides 
that, when a disagreement arises between an insured producer and the insurance 
provider that cannot be resolved by mediation, as to ‘any determination’ made by the 
insurance provider, ‘the disagreement must be resolved through arbitration in 
accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.’ 
72.  228 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2002). 
73.  Id. at 997. 
74.  Id.  
75.  Id.  
76.  Id. at 999. 
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the insurer to initiate an investigation of the claim.77  Spratlin v. Federal 
Crop Insurance Corp. involved a situation in which an insured allegedly 
did not provide timely written notice of loss to the FCIC relating to a loss of 
a soybean crop.78  The crop insurance policy at issue in Spratlin included 
such a provision and permitted indemnification by the FCIC to the insured 
only if written notice of loss was timely received.79  The insured conceded 
that written notice was timely received.80  However, the insured contended 
that, since the FCIC paid indemnity on claims in other cases that were 
untimely filed, the doctrine of waiver applied.81 
The court rejected the insured’s argument, holding the crop insurance 
policy at issue clearly outlined the procedure for filing claims of loss and 
that the policy stated that “no term or condition of the policy shall be 
waived or changed except in writing by a duly authorized representative of 
the FCIC.”82  From the text of the court’s decision, it appears that the 
insured also fell short of its evidentiary burden on the waiver issue, as the 
allegations concerning the FCIC’s payment on other claims that were 
untimely filed were apparently supported only by allegations from the face 
of the complaint.83  Irrespective of the insured’s evidentiary burden on the 
waiver issue, the Spratlin court focused on the observation that the insured 
had legal notice of the insurance policy contract provisions as well as the 
FCIC’s “rules and regulations regardless of the hardship resulting from 
innocent ignorance.”84 
In its decision, the court also cited Merrill.85  In articulating one of the 
themes of Merrill, the court stated:  “The rule, harsh as it may sound, is that 
when one deals with the government, he is expected to know the law and 
may not rely on the conduct of government agents contrary to law.”86  
Significantly, Spratlin demonstrates that courts may apply the Merrill 
doctrine in cases involving the doctrine of waiver.  In particular, an insured 
 
77.  Marc S. Mayerson, Perfecting and Pursuing Liability Insurance Coverage:  A Primer 
for Policyholders on Complying with Notice Obligations, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 1003, 1004 (1997)  
All liability policies contain provisions requiring the policyholder to notify the insurer 
of certain potentially covered events.  Insurance companies typically argue that 
insureds’ compliance with notice provisions is important because prompt notice gives 
them the opportunity to investigate occurrences and (potentially) to participate from 
the outset in the defense of a claim or suit. 
78.  662 F. Supp. 870, 871 (E.D. Ark. 1987). 
79.  Id.  
80.  Id. 
81.  Id.  
82.  Id. at 872. 
83.  Id. at 871. 
84.  Id. at 872. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
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under a federally reinsured crop insurance policy may claim an agent or 
representative of the private crop insurer waived a specific policy provision.  
While Merrill’s application to agents and representatives of private crop 
insurers on waiver claims is unsettled, the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
also operates to estop the actions of agents and representatives of the 
government and federally reinsured crop insurers who misrepresent or 
mislead insureds concerning facts of insurance policy provisions in crop 
insurance claims. 
C. DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
Federally reinsured private crop insurers may also face claims based on 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel in crop insurance litigation.  The doctrine 
of equitable estoppel, in essence, protects an insured who has reasonably 
relied to their detriment based upon the misrepresentations of an insurer or 
the insurer’s agents or representatives.87  One treatise has described the 
doctrine as “conduct or acts on the part of the insurer which are sufficient to 
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the insured that the insurer will not 
insist on a compliance with the provisions of the policy and treat the insured 
in reliance upon such conduct or acts has changed his or her position to his 
or her detriment.”88  While both doctrines are similar, a waiver involves a 
relinquishment of a right and estoppel may arise even in a situation where 
the person or entity has no intention of relinquishing or changing a right.89 
In North Dakota, the Legislature has enacted a statute that codifies the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel.  The statute defines the doctrine as follows:  
“When a party, by that party’s own declaration, act, or omission, 
intentionally and deliberately has led another to believe a particular thing 
true and to act upon such belief, that party shall not be permitted to falsify it 
in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission.”90 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the doctrine of estoppel 
in the insurance context in D.E.M. v. Allickson.91  The underlying case 
involved sexual misconduct allegations by a couple against the pastor of a 
 
87.  ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 152 
(5th ed. 2012)  
Whatever the doctrine of waiver is, the doctrine of estoppel is closely related to it.  
The doctrine of estoppel essentially requires two elements: an actual misrepresentation 
and detrimental reliance.  Misrepresentations, when they occur, are often attributable 
to the activities of agents, who mislead the insured as to the nature of coverage.  The 
insured must rely on this misrepresentation in some way. 
88.  46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1144 (2013). 
89.  John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent Waiver” of Evidentiary Privileges:  Can Reformulating 
the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 271-72 (1995). 
90.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-06 (2013).  
91.  555 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1996). 
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church.92  After the church was made aware of the claims, the church 
notified its insurer of the possibility that a lawsuit may be filed based upon 
alleged sexual misconduct.93  In a written letter to the church, the insurer 
declined insurance coverage for the claims based upon an exclusion in the 
church’s policy for sexual misconduct claims.94  It later was revealed such 
an exclusion did not exist in the policy.95 
After a settlement was reached in the underlying tort case, a Miller-
Shugart agreement96 was reached, which permitted the plaintiffs to directly 
pursue collection on the judgment against the church’s insurer.97  Once the 
plaintiffs sought recovery of the agreement against the insurer, the insurer 
invoked lack of sufficient notice concerning claims of a “bodily injury” as a 
defense to the duty to defend and indemnify the church.98 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected the insurer’s argument.99  
Invoking the rule that an insurer who denies coverage on one ground and 
then later denies coverage on a different ground is estopped from raising the 
latter ground if the insured is prejudiced,100 the court held it would be 
“grossly unjust and unfair to allow [the insurer] to escape liability upon the 
unasserted lack of notice.”101 
Another area in which the law of insurance intersects with the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel is in cases involving insurance by estoppel.  
Professors Jerry and Richmond note that some courts are hesitant to apply 
the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel to expand coverage where 
 
92.  Id. at 597. 
93.  Id.  
94.  Id. at 597-98. 
95.  Id. at 598. 
96.  Jerome Abrams, Failure to Allocate? Nobody Pays:  Using Miller Shugart Settlements 
in Cases of Questionable Insurance Coverage, 4 WM. MITCHELL J. L. & PRAC. 2 (2010). 
Judge Abrams states: 
The Miller-Shugart scenario plays out as follows:  1) some incident takes place 
which gives rise to a claim against a policyholder; 2) the policyholder provides 
notice to its insurer that they want the insurer to handle the claim, usually 
invoking both the defense and indemnification duties under the policy; 3) the 
insurer questions or even denies the claim for reasons it explains; 4) the 
policyholder fearing personal liability – or at least uninsured exposure – makes a 
deal to settle the claim solely recoverable from the insurance coverage which 
arguably covers the claim; 5) the final paperwork allows the claimant to have a 
judgment against the policyholder collectible form the insurance coverage if it is 
established.  Id. 
97.  D.E.M, 555 N.W.2d at 598. 
98.  Id. at 599. 
99.  Id. at 601. 
100.  Id. at 600. 
101.  Id. at 601. 
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none exists.102  The question of whether to extend coverage in an insurance 
contract by estoppel arose in North Dakota in Wangler v. Lerol.103  In 
Wangler, the underlying facts of the case involved an employee of a 
company engaged in turkey farming who filed a negligence claim against 
the employer.104  However, the company involved in the turkey farming 
operation was not a named insured under a farm liability policy in effect, 
and insurance coverage was not available for the plaintiff.105  In relying on 
an affidavit of one of the owners of the company, the plaintiff contended 
insurance by estoppel was available in the case since the owner apparently 
asked “Now, we’re covered aren’t we?” to his insurance agent following 
one of the company’s annual insurance reviews.106 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the plaintiff’s evidence was not 
enough to create a fact question on insurance by estoppel.107  The court 
noted that the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff gave no indication as to 
the response of the insurance agent, nor did it indicate any evidence of 
conduct by the insurance agent or insurer that would lead the insured to an 
incorrect belief concerning the insurance coverage available for the turkey 
farming operation.108 
In the context of crop insurance, the doctrines of waiver and equitable 
estoppel may work in favor of farmer insureds to prevent federally 
reinsured crop insurers from benefiting from inconsistent statements, 
conduct, or their own misrepresentations.  But, as noted earlier, the Merrill 
doctrine has a strong foothold in United States jurisprudence.  After private 
insurers entered the business of federally reinsured crop insurance in the 
1980s, courts soon faced the question of whether Merrill should be 
extended beyond the statement(s), conduct, and actions of government 
representatives or agents to the statement(s), conduct, and actions of 
representatives or agents of federally reinsured crop insurers to bar waiver 
and equitable estoppel claims. 
 
102.  JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 87, at 154 (“Some courts have held that the doctrines 
of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to expand the coverage of policies, which is to be 
distinguished from using the doctrine to prevent rescission of a policy or a defense to a claim 
within coverage.”).   
103.  2003 ND 164, 670 N.W.2d 830. 
104.  Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 832. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. ¶ 15, 670 N.W.2d at 834. 
107.  Id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 835. 
108.  Id. ¶ 15. 
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III. THE MERRILL DOCTRINE: DOES IT APPLY TO FEDERALLY 
REINSURED PRIVATE CROP INSURERS? 
The applicability of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured private 
crop insurers is a critical issue in crop insurance litigation.  Application of 
the doctrine essentially bars the waiver and estoppel claims of farmer 
insureds in the crop insurance context.  Two early federal courts, the United 
States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Mann v. Federal Crop 
Insurance Corp.109 and the United States District Court for the District of 
South Carolina in Walpole v. Great American Insurance Companies,110 
endorsed application of the Merrill doctrine.  However, this early trend 
applying Merrill changed with the decisions of three state courts in the 
early 2000s which rejected the application of Merrill:  the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky in Dailey v. American Growers Insurance,111 the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia in Rain & Hail Insurance Services v. Vickery,112 and 
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee in Simms v. Insurance Co. of North 
America.113  Most recently, the decision of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop 
Insurance Corp.114 revived the applicability of Merrill to federally 
reinsured crop insurers and indicates a true modern split has occurred 
concerning the application of the doctrine.  The resolution of this split in 
cases has significant implications for the future crop insurance claims of 
farmer insureds who assert the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel in 
litigation. 
A. EARLY DECISIONS UPHOLDING MERRILL: MANN V. FEDERAL 
CROP INSURANCE CORP. AND WALPOLE V. GREAT  
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANIES 
The issue of the Merrill doctrine’s applicability to private insurers 
arose after the FCIA extended the writing of federal crop insurance policies 
to private insurers in the 1980s.  One of the first major cases addressing the 
application of Merrill in a crop insurance litigation context was Mann v. 
Federal Crop Insurance Corp.115  It should be noted that Mann involved 
the alleged representations of an FCIC insurance agent and field adjustment 
supervisor and not any agent or representative of a private insurer.  In 
 
109.  710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983). 
110.  914 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
111.  103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003). 
112.  618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
113.  No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005).  
114.  No. 4:09-cv-65, 2012 WL 1193407, at *12-13 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2012). 
115.  710 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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Mann, the plaintiffs and FCIC disputed the total monetary amount due 
under a policy covering the plaintiffs’ peanut crop.116  The plaintiffs 
contended they were entitled to keep proceeds they received following the 
sale of the peanut crop that were above the support price, while the FCIC 
contended that federal regulations required profits above the support price 
to be offset by any crop insurance proceeds.117 
One of the plaintiffs’ main arguments was that the FCIC was estopped 
from offsetting any profits above the support price because agents of the 
FCIC allegedly represented that “bonuses” would not count toward the 
FCIC computation of loss.118  The FCIC agents also apparently admitted 
that the statements were made, but they noted that the statements were 
meant to refer to a “seed and drayage” bonus that had been payable in the 
past and were not meant to include “bonuses” that referred to profits above 
the support price of a crop.119  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
the plaintiffs’ estoppel theory.120  In its holding, the Fourth Circuit focused 
on the fact that the FCIC valued the loss according to the terms and 
conditions of the policy, and it noted that the “farmer is charged with 
knowledge of the regulation and the policy.”121 
Approximately a decade after Mann, in 1994, the United States District 
Court for the District of South Carolina extended the application of Merrill 
to a federally reinsured private crop insurer in Walpole v. Great American 
Insurance Companies.122  Walpole presented a dispute between farmer 
insureds and private insurers concerning the amount of an indemnity under 
a multi-peril crop insurance policy.123  In the case, the farmer insureds lost a 
part of their tomato crop due to a July 1992 storm and then later sold the 
weather-damaged tomatoes that were picked.124 
The multi-peril federally reinsured crop insurance policy at issue 
provided insurance coverage until the completion of the harvest.125  The 
plaintiffs denied they “harvested” the remaining tomato crop after the 
storm, but argued they had “salvaged” it instead.126  In response, the 
 
116.  Id. at 145. 
117.  Id. at 145-46. 
118.  Id. at 147. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  914 F. Supp. 1283 (D.S.C. 1994). 
123.  Id. at 1284. 
124.  Id. at 1285. 
125.  Id. at 1286. 
126.  Id. 
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insurers contended that all the marketed tomatoes picked were required to 
be counted as an offset against the indemnity due under the policy.127 
After analyzing the language of the policy, the court held that all 
tomatoes picked and sold from the tomato crop counted as “harvested” 
production, not “salvaged.”128  The court noted that if the tomatoes were 
“picked,” as what happened in the case, then they are “harvested,” and the 
court also emphasized that the drafters of the policy did not include the 
word “salvage” in any documents.129  The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ 
estoppel argument.130  The plaintiffs had contended that adjusters of the 
insurers allegedly “told Plaintiffs to go ahead and harvest and they would 
be back with the checkbook.”131  The court not only disagreed with the 
plaintiffs’ estoppel argument, but it also appeared to assume that even if it 
could be argued that such statements were misleading, the “statements 
cannot be applied to extend coverage where there is none because the 
doctrine of estoppel does not extend coverage beyond that authorized by the 
policy.”132  In applying Merrill to the conduct of a private crop insurer,133 
the court essentially appeared to imply that even if representations or 
misrepresentations were made by the agents of the insurer, such 
representations “cannot vary the clear terms of the policy.”134  Despite 
Walpole extending the rules of Merrill and Mann so as to essentially shield 
private insurers who issue federally reinsured crop insurance policies from 
waiver and equitable estoppel claims, the early rule extending Merrill to 
private insurers was eclipsed approximately a decade later by the decisions 
of three state courts in Kentucky, Georgia and Tennessee. 
B. THE MERRILL DOCTRINE CHALLENGED: DAILEY V. AMERICAN 
GROWERS INSURANCE, RAIN & HAIL INSURANCE SERVICES V. 
VICKERY, AND SIMMS V. INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Kentucky became the first court to 
challenge the application of the Merrill doctrine to federally reinsured crop 
insurers when it decided Dailey v. American Growers Insurance.135  In 
 
127.  Id. at 1289. 
128.  Id. at 1288. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 1290. 
131.  Id.  
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 12901-91.  The court in Walpole cited both Mann and Merrill in its decision.  In 
footnote 12, the court noted that “that the Merrill and Mann holdings are equally applicable to 
FCIC reinsured policies, as well as FCIC directly issued policies.”  Id. at 1290 n.12. 
134.  Id. at 1291. 
135.  103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003). 
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Dailey, a Kentucky tobacco farmer brought a number of state law claims, 
primarily under the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, 
against a private crop insurer.136  The heart of the dispute, like many other 
disputes involving crop insurance and the Merrill doctrine, involved a 
question as to the proper percentage of an indemnity to be paid for a crop 
loss.  The tobacco farmer contended the coverage level was 75%, while the 
private crop insurer argued coverage should have been available at the 55% 
level.137  In Dailey, the agent of the private crop insurer apparently assisted 
with the issuance of a federally reinsured crop insurance policy in the 
personal name of the insured in 1995 and then assisted with the issuance of 
a crop insurance policy in the name of an unincorporated business entity in 
1996.138  After a tobacco crop loss in 1996, the private crop insurer denied 
coverage on the 1996 policy, which provided for 75% coverage of the 
tobacco crop, on the basis that the unincorporated business entity was not 
insurable and transferred coverage to the 1995 policy, which provided for 
the lower 55% indemnity.139 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the crop insurer largely 
on the basis that it found that multi-peril crop insurance policies are subject 
to FCIC regulations, and thus any state law claims were preempted.140  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held the claims were not preempted 
by the FCIA or FCIC regulations.141  Significantly, a majority of the 
Kentucky Supreme Court also delivered a sweeping concurrence on the 
issue of the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private crop 
insurers. 
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the private crop insurer 
contended that the insured’s estoppel claim was barred by the Merrill 
doctrine.142  Under the facts of the case, the agent of the private crop 
insurer, not the insured, apparently completed the application form and 
drafted the application in the insureds personal name in 1995 and the name 
of the unincorporated business entity in 1996.143  In addition, the testimony 
revealed that the agent also apparently instigated the process to obtain 
higher insurance coverage levels on the tobacco crop.144  It also appeared 
from the text of Dailey that there was no evidence that the insured failed to 
 
136.  Id. at 62. 
137.  Id. at 62-63. 
138.  Id.  
139.  Id. at 63. 
140.  Id.  
141.  Id. at 66. 
142.  Id. (Cooper, J., concurring). 
143.  Id. at 67-68. 
144.  Id. at 70. 
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exercise due diligence concerning the application process or that an in pari 
delicto145 type of situation existed with the case. 
In finding that the insured had a colorable estoppel claim, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court not only closely surveyed the factual allegations 
surrounding the case, but also examined the very purpose of the Merrill 
doctrine itself.  The Kentucky Supreme Court remarked that one of the 
important aspects of the Merrill doctrine is that it upholds the doctrine of 
separation of powers in that “judge-made principles such as estoppel should 
not be applied to open the public coffers when Congress has explicitly 
ordered them closed.”146  The Kentucky Supreme Court also noted that 
when a private insurance company is involved, separation of powers is not 
an issue at all.147  Furthermore, the court in Dailey also compared the FCIA 
to the federal flood insurance program and the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968 (“NFIA”).148  The Dailey court observed that under the NFIA, 
private insurers are designated “fiscal agents” of the United States,149 but 
under the statutory language of the FCIA, private insurers are not deemed to 
be “fiscal agents” of the United States, so separation of powers concerns are 
not present with federally reinsured crop insurance companies.150  Finally, 
the Dailey court also analogized the FCIC and federally reinsured crop 
insurers to the private insurers that comprise the Foreign Credit Insurance 
Association.151  The Dailey court noted that two United States federal 
circuit courts of appeal, the Eleventh Circuit152 and the Third Circuit,153 
rejected application of the Merrill doctrine to the Foreign Credit Insurance 
Association.154 
Approximately two years later, the Court of Appeals of Georgia 
followed the Dailey decision in Rain & Hail Insurance Services v. 
 
145.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines in pari delicto as “equally at fault.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 806 (8th ed. 2004). 
146.  Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 69. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012). 
150.  Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 69. 
151.  Id. at 70 (“The Foreign Credit Insurance Association . . . is a collection of private 
insurance companies formed at the behest of the United States Export-Import Bank . . . to provide 
insurance for foreign commercial ventures.”).  Law review articles addressing the Foreign Credit 
Insurance Association in more detail include Robert Chapman, The High Utility of FCIA 
Insurance to Banks in Financing Trade, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439 (1986); Karen 
Hudes, Protecting Against Inconvertibility and Transfer Risk:  An Outline of Trade Financing 
Programs of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 9 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
461 (1986); S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance:  OPIC, MIGA, Eximbank and 
Other Providers, 5 PACE INT’L L. REV. 59 (1993).   
152.  Nu-Air Mfg. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. of N.Y., 822 F.2d 987 (11th Cir. 1987). 
153.  Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 777 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985). 
154.  Dailey, 103 S.W.3d at 70. 
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Vickery.155  In Vickery, a private crop insurer denied the insureds’ claims 
for prevented planting losses on the basis that the insureds did not comply 
with the federally reinsured multi-peril crop insurance policies by 
submitting an “intended acreage report” to the insurer with their application 
for insurance.156  The insureds contended in response that they reasonably 
relied upon the representations of an agent of the private insurer who 
reportedly informed them that a personal production history would suffice 
for the application.157  The policy in question provided that its provisions 
could “not be waived by any crop insurance agent.”158 
The trial court denied summary judgment to the private crop insurer on 
the insureds’ equitable estoppel claim.159  In upholding the trial court’s 
denial of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a 
fact issue remained as to whether the insureds reasonably relied upon the 
agent’s representations.160  In its decision, the Court of Appeals cited Dailey 
and noted that, because the claim at issue did not “represent a direct claim 
on the public treasury,” the Merrill doctrine did not apply.161 
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee has also limited the 
applicability of Merrill to private crop insurers.  In the 2005 Simms v. 
Insurance Co. of North America decision, a Tennessee trial court granted 
summary judgment to a private crop insurer against the claims of an insured 
who allegedly failed to follow the loss provisions of a multi-peril crop 
insurance policy after suffering a tobacco crop loss.162  The private insurer 
argued that it denied coverage on the basis that the insured destroyed the 
tobacco crop before the insurer had an opportunity to appraise the crop 
loss.163 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that a fact issue 
existed on the insured’s estoppel and waiver claims.164  Testimony at the 
trial court level apparently revealed that an agent of the private crop insurer 
instructed the insured to proceed to “bush hog” the tobacco crop after the 
insured reported the loss.165  In its decision, the Simms court not only cited 
 
155.  618 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
156.  Id. at 115. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. at 117. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at 116-17. 
162.  No. E2005-00062-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2604049, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 
2005). 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. at *6. 
165.  Id. at *3. 
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Dailey and Vickery,166 but also cited the principle that courts should 
construe insurance policy provisions relating to coverage in favor of the 
insured.167  The Court of Appeals found an issue of fact even though the 
insured apparently did not include a provision in an affidavit stating that he 
reasonably relied on the agent’s representations.168  But the recent decision 
of another court in Tennessee, this time a federal court, jeopardizes the 
developing rule that the Merrill doctrine does not preclude waiver and 
equitable estoppel claims against federally reinsured private crop insurers. 
C. MERRILL REVIVED? SKYMONT FARMS V. FEDERAL  
CROP INSURANCE CORP. 
In Skymont Farms v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee breathed life into the 
Merrill doctrine’s applicability to private insurers.169  The underlying facts 
of the Skymont Farms case involved the denial of a crop insurance claim 
following an August 2006 hailstorm on the basis the insured did not have an 
insurable interest in the crop.170  The private insurer contended that the 
insured did not have a 100% ownership or insurable interest in the land at 
issue as noted in the application, and it argued that since this occurred, the 
policy could be properly voided on the basis of material 
misrepresentation.171 
In the case, it appeared that the insurer issued the policy without 
inspecting the crops or noting any problems with the application for 
insurance.172  In addition, the adjuster of the insurer apparently identified no 
problems while initially adjusting the claim.173  However, the Skymont 
Farms court adopted the principles of Merrill to bar the estoppel claims of 
the insured.174 
In examining Skymont Farms, one can differentiate the case from 
Dailey, Vickery, and Simms.  In all three of those cases, it appeared that 
there was no solid evidence that the insureds’ failed to exercise due 
diligence concerning the claims nor did they allegedly commit any arguably 
 
166.  Id. at *4. 
167. Id. at *6 (“We further find that a reasonable construction of the insurance policy in 
favor of providing coverage to the insured yields the conclusion that preserving a representative 
sample of the failed crop would not necessarily in all cases be required.”). 
168.  Id. 
169.  No. 4:09–cv–65, 2012 WL 1193407 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012). 
170.  Id. at *1. 
171.  Id. at *1, *7-10. 
172.  Id. at *12. 
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174.  Id. at *13. 
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negligent acts themselves.  But in Skymont Farms, the court voided the 
policy on the basis of misrepresentation.175  Therefore, the court reasoned 
that to allow coverage under estoppel when it was otherwise voided “would 
contravene the prohibition against estoppel.”176 
Skymont Farms leaves the future application of the Merrill doctrine to 
federally reinsured crop insurers in unsettled waters.  Future courts can 
resolve this key question by applying a strong presumption against the 
application of Merrill, but with exceptions. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Courts examining the issue of applying Merrill to the conduct of agents 
of federally reinsured crop insurance companies are faced with addressing 
two primary policy considerations.  On the one hand, there is a general duty 
for all who enter into contractual arrangements to read the documents that 
they sign.177  Whether or not this general duty exists with insurance 
contracts is ambiguous,178 but, as a general policy matter, insureds should 
have at least some semblance of a duty to investigate policy provisions of 
federally reinsured crop insurance contracts. 
However, on the other hand, as a policy matter farmer insureds should 
be able to place at least some level of trust and confidence in the agent of a 
federally reinsured private crop insurer.  Such a duty should not arise to the 
level of a fiduciary relationship,179 but there should at least be some level of 
a duty of fair dealing.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight 
Circuit described such a level of good faith of FCIC agents in 1985 in 
A.W.G. Farms Inc. v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. as follows: 
While we do not hold the government liable under an estoppel 
theory . . . the factual background regarding the FCIC’s course of 
dealing with these growers must be considered under basic 
principles of good faith and fairness . . . . One may have to turn 
‘square corners’ when dealing with a governmental entity, but this 
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176.  Id. 
177.  Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts:  The Challenge 
That is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 729 (2008)  (“The duty to read contracts is a well 
-recognized common law doctrine, which holds contracting parties responsible for the written 
terms of a contract, whether or not they actually read them.  This doctrine is primarily aimed at 
achieving stability and promoting reliance upon contracts.”). 
178.  James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is Indispensable, If We 
Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151, 165 (1998). 
179.  Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 1, 12 (2004). 
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does not mean the  government may operate so recklessly so as to 
put parties dealing with it entirely at its mercy.180 
The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota 
approvingly quoted this language in 1999, but also noted that even though 
the “FCIC may not be estopped by representations that subsequently prove 
inaccurate, it surely cannot seek refuge behind the technicalities of offer and 
acceptance unique to insurance law, nor the rules of liability governing 
common law reinsurance arrangements, in order to escape its 
obligations.”181  Such a principle should apply to federally reinsured private 
crop insurance providers as well, particularly since they are afforded 
specific protection in the form of reinsurance by the federal government.182 
To balance both the insureds’ duty to investigate policy provisions, the 
insurer’s duty of good faith in the context of federally reinsured crop 
insurance policies, and the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel is a 
difficult endeavor.  One approach is the adoption of a rule where Merrill 
would not apply in cases of “affirmative misconduct” by the agents of a 
private crop insurer, and in limited cases courts have allowed equitable 
estoppel claims against the government where “affirmative misconduct” is 
found.183  But the drawback of the “affirmative misconduct” exception is 
that it typically involves claims against the government and not those 
against private entities.  
One rule that could balance both the interests of farmer insureds and 
federally reinsured private crop insurers is as follows:  (1) That a heavy 
presumption against the application of Merrill to federally reinsured private 
crop insurers be followed; and (2) that Merrill only apply when a federally 
reinsured private crop insurer makes a “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
showing that the farmer insured failed to adequately investigate the 
provisions concerning a crop insurance policy, or when there is a “clear and 
convincing” evidentiary showing that the insured made a fraudulent 
misrepresentation on an application for insurance.  The “clear and 
convincing” evidentiary standard would retain the application of Merrill to 
the exceptional cases rather than the general rule that developed in Dailey, 
Vickery and Simms, but yet reserve its application for cases in which it is 
“highly probable” that the insured(s) failed to take action to properly 
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investigate crop insurance policy provisions.184  The adoption of this rule by 
the courts would adequately balance the interests of both federally reinsured 
private crop insurers and farmer insureds, help to provide a fair playing 
field for all in the crop insurance industry, and provide a workable objective 
standard to examine each unique fact pattern on a case-by-case basis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The very economic livelihood of thousands of farmers is implicated by 
the existence of a vital federal crop insurance program.185  It is likely that a 
notable number of cases involving questions of coverage under federally 
reinsured crop insurance policies are amicably resolved without litigation.  
But in some cases, allegations of misrepresentations as to the amount of or 
nature of coverage may arise.  It is difficult to balance competing claims of 
both a federally reinsured crop insurer and a farmer insured.  On the one 
hand, a federally reinsured crop insurer is likely to claim that it should be 
able to completely rely upon the provision of a policy concerning coverage.  
On the other hand, a farmer insured is likely to claim that he or she should 
be able to operate free from any misrepresentations of the agents or 
representatives of private insurers. 
That balance is best preserved by the courts applying a heavy 
presumption against application of the Merrill doctrine.  Farmer insureds 
who conduct due diligence concerning the provisions of a crop insurance 
policy, as a policy matter, should not have their waiver and equitable 
estoppel claims against private insurers quashed by the Merrill doctrine.  
The only time Merrill should apply is when the private crop insurer makes a 
“clear and convincing” evidentiary showing that the farmer insured failed to 
adequately investigate the provisions concerning a crop insurance policy.  
The adoption by the courts of such a rule in future cases involving Merrill 
adequately balances both the interests and objectives of federally reinsured 
private crop insurers and farmer insureds. 
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